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Representationism,
1 as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an expe-
rience just is its representational content, where that representational content can
itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Rep-
resentationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. (I
say ‘seem’ because in my view, representationists cannot actually handle either type
of experience successfully, but I will put that claim to one side here.) I will argue that
Michael Tye’s heroic attempt (this volume) at a representationist theory of pain,
although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the
root of this difference.
Representationism is in part an attempt to make an account of phenomenal char-
acter comport with G. E. Moore’s diaphanousness intuition, the idea of which is that
when I try to introspect my experience of the red tomato, I only succeed in attend-
ing to the color of the tomato itself, and not to any mental feature of the experience.
The representationist thinks we can exploit this intuition to explain phenomenal char-
acter in nonphenomenal terms. To understand representationism, we need to know
what to make of the phrase ‘representational content’ as applied to an experience.
There is no clear pretheoretical notion of representational content as applied to an expe-
rience, certainly none that will be of use to the representationist. True, I can speak of
seeing that and seeing as, and more generally of experiencing that and experiencing
as. Looking at the gas gauge, I can say that I see that the tank is empty (Dretske 1995).
And I can say that I experience my wound as a medical emergency. These (and other)
pretheoretical ways of thinking of something that could be called the representational
content of experience have little to do with phenomenology or with the kind of prop-
erties that the representationist takes the phenomenology to constitutively represent.
Thus the representationist thesis involves a partially stipulated notion of representa-
tional content. This is not, in itself, a criticism, but as I shall argue, there is a problem
about how the stipulation should go in the case of pain.
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Thus in my view, the dispute between Tye and Colin McGinn over whether pain
even has representational content is not a dispute about a matter of fact, but a dispute
about how to talk. The same applies to Tye’s claim that a referred pain (e.g., a pain in
the inside of the left arm caused by malfunction in the heart or a pain in the groin
caused by malfunction in the kidney) is nonveridical. Pretheoretically, we might
(might!) regard such a pain as misleading but not false or inaccurate or nonveridical.
We are willing to allow hallucinations in which it seems to us that there is a colored
surface in front of us but there is no colored surface that we are seeing, in front or
elsewhere. However, we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations, cases where it seems
that I have a pain but in fact there is no pain. Tye does not argue for pain hallucina-
tions in which there seems to be a pain but there is no pain at all, but since he does
say that referred pain is nonveridical, he must think that a referred pain in the arm
is not actually in the arm. Where, then, is it? In the heart? It is not our practice to
assign referred pain in this way, so such a claim is at best stipulative.
In the case of representationism about some aspects of visual phenomenology, there
is a fairly natural line of stipulation. My color experience represents colors, or color-
like properties. (In speaking of colorlike properties, I am alluding to Sydney Shoe-
maker’s “phenomenal properties” [1994, a,b] or “appearance properties” [2001] or
Michael Thau’s [2002] nameless properties.) But, according to me, there is no obvious
candidate for an objectively assessable property that bears to pain experience the same
relation that color bears to color experience. But ﬁrst, let us ask a prior question: what
in the domain of pain corresponds to the tomato, namely, the thing that is red? Is it
the chair leg on which I stub my toe (yet again), which could be said to have a painish
or painy quality to it in virtue of its tendency to cause pain–experience in certain cir-
cumstances, just as the tomato causes the sensation of red in certain circumstances?
Is it the stubbed toe itself, which we experience as aching, just as we experience the
tomato as red? Or, given the fact of phantom-limb pain, is it the toeish part of 
the body image rather than the toe itself? None of these seems obviously better than
the others.
Once we have stipulated what we mean by the representational content of pain, it
is a substantive and nonstipulative question whether the phenomenal character of
pain is that stipulated representational content. The stipulative aspect of the issue is
reﬂected in Tye’s presentation by the fact that two-thirds of the way through the paper,
he has not yet quite stated what he intends to stipulate. He says “What, then, is the
phenomenal character of pain?” and considers the possibility that one might say the
representational content of pain is a matter of its representing subjective qualities of
the bodily region in which the pain occurs. He rejects this proposal on the groundBodily Sensations 139
that the phenomenal character of a pain in the leg can be present even when there
is no such bodily region (as in phantom-limb pain), suggesting instead that “the phe-
nomenal character of pain is representational content of a certain sort, content into
which the experienced qualities enter” (this volume, emphasis added). The “certain sort”
alludes to his view that the relevant contents are nonconceptual, abstract, and 
poised.
The problem that is worrying me is what these “subjective qualities” or “experi-
enced qualities” are in terms of which Tye characterizes the representational contents
of the phenomenal character of pain. (I will use the former phrase and indicate the
problem of the obscurity typographically by talking of Subjective Qualities.) Examples
of Subjective Qualities in Tye’s sense are what we speak of when we describe a pain
as sharp, aching, throbbing, or burning. Here is the problem: why don’t these Sub-
jective Qualities bring in the very unreduced phenomenality that the representation-
ist is seeking to avoid?
Let me explain via the comparison with Shoemaker’s (1994a,b; 2001) version of rep-
resentationism mentioned above. Shoemaker honors the diaphanousness intuition
without the reductionist aspect of representationism. He holds that when one looks
at a red tomato, one’s experience has a phenomenal character that represents the
tomato as having a certain appearance property and also as being red, the latter via
the former. Each appearance property of an object can be deﬁned in terms of pro-
duction by it in certain circumstances of a certain phenomenal character of experi-
ence. The view is motivated in part by the possibility of an inverted spectrum. If Jack
and Jill are spectrum inverted, Jack’s experience of the tomato represents it both as
red and as having appearance property A (the former via the latter). Jill’s experience
represents the tomato as red and as having appearance property A*. (Jack’s experience
represents grass as green and A*, whereas Jill’s experience represents grass as green and
A.) What determines that Jack’s experience represents appearance property A is that
it has phenomenal character PC, and A gets its identity (with respect to Jack) from the
production of PC in normal viewing conditions. Red can be identiﬁed with the pro-
duction of PC in Jack, PC* in Jill, and so on. PC is metaphysically more basic than A
since PC is what makes it the case that the experience represents A. But A is epistem-
ically more basic than PC in that in perception of colors one is aware of A rather than
PC. And in introspection, one is aware that one’s experience represents A. Awareness
of PC, by contrast, is at least in part theoretical (which I see as a big problem with
Shoemaker’s view). Shoemaker’s view of the relation between phenomenal character
and appearance properties has been in ﬂux, but what I think has been constant is
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in terms of the other taken as basic. Or, if the two are deﬁned in terms of one another
as a “package deal,” with neither as basic, the deﬁnition would not capture the dif-
ference between the ·PC, AÒ pair and the very different ·PC*, A*Ò pair. Shoemaker’s
appearance properties are in that sense of a piece with phenomenal characters.
Shoemaker’s (2001) view of pain is that pain experiences are perceptions that rep-
resent a part of the body as instantiating an appearance property. Such a view is not
problematic for Shoemaker since if he is to be called a representationist, his repre-
sentationism is nonreductionist: he is not attempting to explain phenomenal char-
acter in nonphenomenal terms. But if Tye’s Subjective Qualities are appearance
properties, then Tye cannot be a representationist in the sense that he at least used to
endorse, in which phenomenal character is supposed to be explained in nonphe-
nomenal terms.
Does Tye give us any reason to think that his Subjective Qualities are not appear-
ance properties in a sense that undermines his (former?) project? Well, if he said that
as a matter of empirical fact, these Subjective Qualities turn out to be (aspects of) tissue
damage, then I think they could not be taken by him to be appearance properties. But
Tye’s view is not that Subjective Qualities are features of tissue damage. Rather, what
he says is something importantly different, namely that “pain” applies to tissue
damage when it is within the content of a pain experience. And it is good that he
does not identify Subjective Qualities with aspects of tissue damage, since that iden-
tiﬁcation would be most implausible given that exactly the same tissue damage in the
foot can give rise to a more intense pain—or one that is different in other ways—in
me than in you because of differences between my ﬁbers leading from the foot to the
brain and yours.
The representationist says that when I try to introspect my experience of the stubbed
toe, I only succeed in attending to the Subjective Quality of the toe. My question to
Tye has been: why think of the Subjective Quality of the toe as like the redness of the
tomato rather than like an appearance property of the tomato? Of course, Tye is a rep-
resentationist about visual experience as well as about pain, so presumably he will
reject the question or regard it as a choice between a correct option (red) and a con-
fused option (an appearance property).
To see the difﬁculty in such a position, we have to recognize that colors are objec-
tive in a way that Subjective Qualities are not. There is an appearance–reality distinc-
tion for red but not for a Subjective Quality such as achiness. (Aydede [forthcoming]
quotes a characterization of pain from the International Association for the Study of
Pain that pretty much makes the point that there is no appearance–reality distinction
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cannot have its Subjective Quality if no one is having pain. That is, there can be
unseen red but not unfelt achiness. Indeed, tomatoes would still be red even if there
never had been any people or other creatures who could see them. But in a world
without pain-feeling creatures, there would be no Subjective Qualities at all, no
burning limbs or achy toes. In the case of color, a physicalist theory has some plau-
sibility. For example, colors may be held to be sets of reﬂectances. This account ﬁts
with the idea that there could be colors in a world with no perceivers, since tomatoes
could reﬂect light even if no one was there to see it. But a physicalist account of Sub-
jective Qualities in terms of tissue damage is not remotely plausible, for the reason
given above—the Subjective Qualities of a toe depend not only on the tissue damage
but on the connection between tissue damage and the brain. Whether something is
red can be an objective matter, but whether my toe aches is something others know
about only because of my special privileged relation to it. Finally, as Shoemaker (2001)
notes, there is a many–one relation between color–appearance properties and color.
Looking around the room, I see all four walls as white, but the color–relevant appear-
ance properties are nonetheless different because of differences in lighting. However,
there is no corresponding distinction in the domain of pain. Every slight difference
in appearance is a difference in Subjective Quality, indicating that Subjective Quali-
ties are mentalistic in a way that colors are not.
That is why bodily sensations have been a challenge for representationism. If the
representationist proposes to explain phenomenal character in nonmentalistic and
especially nonphenomenal terms, there must be something for the phenomenal char-
acter to (constitutively) represent that is not itself individuated with respect to phenome-
nal character. Color is a better bet to pass this test (even if it does not pass in the end)
than are Subjective Qualities.
Of course the view of color that I have been presupposing is itself controversial. It
may be said that a physicalistic theory of color ignores the fact that what color 
something has is relative to the perceiver. Colored objects produce slightly different
phenomenal characters in different normal observers in normal circumstances,
because the various parts of the eye differ among normal perceivers—perceivers who
can be assumed to perceive correctly—male versus female, young versus old, black
versus white (Block 1999). Perhaps color is not objective after all. So perhaps we should
say that in a world without perceivers, nothing has colors. Or perhaps we should say
that they have all colors—each relative to a different possible but nonactual perceiver.
And once we have gone that far, we might say instead that there are no colors even
in the actual world, rather merely the projection of phenomenal characters onto
objects (Boghossian and Velleman 1989, 1991). But these are all views of color thatNed Block 142
would deprive representationism of its reductionist point. The challenge to Tye is 
to manage to assimilate Subjective Qualities to color as an objectivist would see 
color.
2
Notes
1. Some say ‘representationalism,’ but I prefer ‘representationism.’ “Representationism” is
shorter and ‘representationalism’ is ambiguous, being used also to mean the doctrine in episte-
mology that seeing is mediated by awareness of a representation, namely, indirect or represen-
tative realism. As Aydede (forthcoming) notes, representationism is more akin to direct rather
than indirect realism, so the ambiguity is confusing. Since we still have a chance for the more
rational use of terms, I hope readers will adopt ‘representationism.’
2. I am grateful to Sydney Shoemaker for some comments on an earlier draft.
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